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Abstract 
Two experiments tested participants’ attributions for others’ immoral behaviors when conducted for 
more versus less money. We hypothesized and found that observers would blame wrongdoers more 
when seeing a transgression enacted for little rather than a lot of money, and that this would be evident in 
observers’ hand-washing behavior. Experiment 1 used a cognitive dissonance paradigm. Participants (N 
= 160) observed a confederate lie in exchange for either a relatively large or small monetary payment. 
Participants blamed the liar more in the small (versus large) money condition. Participants (N = 184) in 
Experiment 2 saw images of someone knocking over another to obtain a small, medium, or large 
monetary sum. In the small (versus large) money condition, participants blamed the perpetrator (money) 
more. Hence, participants assigned less blame to moral wrong-doers, if the latter enacted their deed to 
obtain relatively large sums of money. Small amounts of money accentuate the immorality of others’ 
transgressions. 
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Money, Moral Transgressions, and Blame  
Money can make people behave in a foolish, unsavory way: Take and make risky bets, tattoo 
permanent advertising on their foreheads, prostitute themselves, and start wars – not to mention the 
garden-variety impieties of cheating, lying, and stealing. Yet with many such actions, there may be a tacit, 
if reluctant, understanding by observers that, when “big money” is at stake, people are tempted to commit 
odd, unlawful, or immoral acts. While acknowledging that money has varied effects – including positive 
and neutral (Belk & Wallendorf, 1990; Burroughs & Rindfleisch, 2002; Guo et al., 2012; Lea & Webley, 
2006; Mishkin, 1992; Smith, 1776/1977; Yang et al., 2013; Zhou & Gao, 2008; Zhou, Vohs, & 
Baumeister, 2009) – its connotations with intemperance, illegality, and immorality raise the questions of 
when observers would judge others’ illicit actions under the auspices of money as immoral or perhaps 
simply as less moral, and whether evidence for this judgment would be manifested in observers’ 
hand-washing behavior. We predicted that the amount of money at stake would be a key factor. 
Money Can Justify Moral Transgression 
Individuals long have considered money to be a dangerously powerful force in their and others’ 
lives (Lea & Webley, 2006). Under desperate circumstances, some will seemingly do anything for 
money, such as selling their bodily organs or their children (Lea & Webley, 2006). As Lea and Webley 
(2006, p. 197) noted, “The evidence of labor market history is that there is no job that absolutely no one 
could be induced to do, if sufficient money was offered… In the right circumstances, money has the 
capacity to overwhelm all other motivators.” Hence, the motive to obtain money can override even basic 
motives such as the desire to behave in line with moral standards.  
Given its motivational power, money may constitute a justification for one’s moral 
transgressions. The literature hints at this notion. Thompson, Harred, and Burks (2003) concluded that 
topless dancers in the United States use payment for their services as a way to neutralize the moral ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
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dissonance that they presumably experience. In a similar vein, Prasad (1999) argued that clients use 
money to distance themselves morally and emotionally from prostitutes.   
Classic studies in psychology are also relevant. One such study asked participants to lie to 
another person and present a dull task as interesting. Some participants were paid $20 for this moral 
transgression, others were paid $1, and still others (control group) were not asked to lie (Festinger & 
Carlsmith, 1959). Participants who received $20 (compared to those who received $1) seemingly used 
money as a justification for their lies, in that they did not change their attitude toward the task and instead 
found the task as boring as those in the control group. We interpret this finding as suggesting that, if there 
is enough of a monetary incentive to commit a moral transgression, then the smaller the ethical 
dissonance (Barkan, Ayal, Gino, & Ariely, 2012) will be – perhaps because the immoral act had been 
adequately justified.  
We used a similar paradigm as this classic dissonance study, but focused not on attitudes about 
the task but rather on attitudes about the actor. We hypothesized that lying about a boring task for a 
relatively small (vs. large) sum of money will change observers’ attitudes, as they will consider the liar 
more immoral. 
Money is Salient 
Individuals spontaneously make inferences about potential causes of events (Heider, 1958). 
They can attribute outcomes to internal or external causes, meaning that they assign the cause of a 
behavior either to an actor’s disposition (e.g., personality, attitudes) or the situation in which the behavior 
was embedded. We propose that individuals not only use obtaining money to justify their own moral 
transgressions, but they also see obtaining money as a way to justify others’ transgressions. 
What factors do observers take into account when they attempt to figure out the causes of an 
event? Much of the time they focus on others, and particularly on others’ traits, chronic attitudes, or ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
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motives (Storms, 1973; Taylor & Fiske, 1975). Underestimating the role of situational factors often has a 
big effect on the outcome (Gilbert & Malone, 1995). That is, in making attributions, observers may 
assign causal weight to that which is most salient (Roese & Vohs, 2012). 
As an object of desire, money is difficult to ignore, and especially so when it comes in large 
amounts (Gino & Pierce, 2009). The mere salience of money increases self-sufficiency (Vohs, Mead, & 
Goode, 2006) and can encourage unethical behavior (Gino & Pierce, 2009; Yang et al., 2013). Thus, even 
though observers are inclined to attribute others’ behavior to internal causes, we propose that, in the case 
of a relatively large monetary sum (which constitutes a salient cue), participants will attribute others’ 
behavior to the influence of money. 
Consider, again, the classic cognitive dissonance study discussed above (Festinger & Carlsmith, 
1959), in which participants were paid varying amounts to lie about a dull task. Would observers 
consider money to be more of a driving force of the actor’s behavior when the wrongdoing is committed 
for a larger or a smaller monetary reward? We propose that observers would perceive the desire to obtain 
larger, as opposed to smaller, amounts of money as such a pull on the actor’s behavior that the person 
would not be viewed as morally corrupt. Therefore Experiment 1 tests the hypothesis that observers will 
infer more intrinsic motivation when viewing an immoral behavior enacted for a small versus large 
monetary amount. 
We tested this hypothesis by having participants wash their hands after viewing an immoral act. 
Research on contamination shows that objects can transfer their immoral essence through physical 
contact. Given our reasoning on how money can make others become symbolically filthy when only a 
pittance of it is enough to produce immoral behaviors, we predicted that observers would feel rather 
contaminated from coming into contact with the actor – or even representations of the actor (here, in the 
form of a photograph). Specifically, the contamination effect will be larger when an immoral act has been ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
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committed for a small (vs. large) sum of money, which will manifest in a greater desire for physical 
cleansing. This proposal constitutes the main contribution of our research.  
Contamination by negative stimuli leads to emotional responses and motivations to distance 
oneself from tainted people or objects (Haidt, Rozin, McCauley, & Imada, 1997; Paharia, Vohs, & 
Deshpandé, 2013; Rozin & Fallon, 1987). For example, companions of people with abominations of the 
body stigma or tribal stigma are also regarded as discredited (Pryor, Reeder, & Monroe, 2012). Money 
earned through unethical channels (e.g., profit earned through illegal operation) is perceived as less 
desirable and valuable than money earned through neutral channels (e.g., earnings of a business without 
any accompanying negative information). Products considered contaminated through physical contact 
with disgusting goods also elicit consumers’ disgust and lower their product evaluation (Morales & 
Fitzsimons, 2007). Feelings of disgust drive consumers to respond unfavorably to products that have 
been touched by others (Argo, Dahl, & Morales, 2006). Tainted objects threaten individuals’ moral 
self-image (Stellar & Willer, 2013). Indirect or implicit ascription of immorality can take the form of 
physical distancing (Lee & Schwarz, 2011), such as washing one’s hands, as a symbolic attempt for 
moral cleanliness. What is more, motor modality involved in a transgression figures prominently in the 
embodiment of moral purity (Lee & Schwarz, 2010).   
Recent findings highlight the parallels between physical and moral contamination in which 
moral transgressions are akin to being physically filthy. Zhong and Liljenquist (2006) found that 
participants who recalled an immoral behavior were more likely to choose an antiseptic wipe rather than 
a pencil as a free gift, suggesting a desire to sanitize themselves. They also found that even the mere act 
of rewriting an immoral story about another person increased participants’ desires to cleanse. 
Converging evidence has shown that physical cleanliness is associated with, or influences, moral 
judgments (Schnall, Benton, & Harvey, 2008) or judgments of moral purity (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
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Therefore, in Experiment 1 and 2, we tested the hypothesis that, when a lie is told for a small monetary 
sum, observers will wash their hands longer after contact with a liar than with money. This hypothesis 
follows from our proposal that, when a lie is told for a small monetary sum, observers will view factors 
internal to the actor as a stronger force in producing the outcome than the lure of money.   
Overview 
In Experiment 1, we relied on the Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) cognitive dissonance 
paradigm, in which participants witnessed a person lie either for a larger or smaller monetary amount. 
Subsequently, they come into physical contact with either the liar or the money. We induced participants 
to wash their hands next, and we measured hand-washing duration as an implicit indicator of ascriptions 
of filth or immorality to which they had been contaminated. Experiment 2 presented participants with 
images of a person knocking someone over in order to snatch some money off the ground. We asked 
participants to hold close up pictures showing either the hand of the perpetrator reaching for the money or 
the money laying on the ground. We used a behavioral measure similar to that of Experiment 1, and we 
also measured directly the proportion of blame attributed to money versus perpetrator.  
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 tested attitudes toward money after observing a wrongdoing. We relied on a 
classic cognitive dissonance paradigm (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959), with participants serving as 
observers. A confederate was (a) paid a relatively large monetary sum (￥50) to lie about a boring task, 
(b) paid a relatively small monetary sum (￥1) to lie about the same task, or (c) not paid and instructed to 
tell the truth. Then some participants shook hands with the confederate (the liar), whereas others counted 
money. Subsequently, all participants were instructed to wash their hands, with duration of 
hand-washing unobtrusively recorded as a measure of desire to cleanse symbolically the self after 
coming into contact with a moral contagion. ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
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We tested the idea that observers would implicitly view an actor lying for a small sum of money 
as more immoral than the money itself. That is, observers would want to cleanse themselves behaviorally, 
and therefore would spend more time hand-washing after physical contact with the liar than after 
physical contact with money. Conversely, observers would implicitly view money itself as more 
immoral than an actor lying for a large sum of money. That is, in the large money condition, observers 
would distance themselves behaviorally and would spend more time hand-washing after physical contact 
with the money than with the liar. 
Method 
Participants and Experimental Design   
We tested individually 160 (81 female) university students and remunerated them with ￥5. 
Their ages ranged from 17 to 34 years (M = 23.25, SD = 3.02). The design was a 3 (lie condition: no lie, 
small money lie, or large money lie) × 2 (object touched: hand-shaking, money-counting) 
between-subjects factorial. We randomly assigned participants to one of the six experimental conditions. 
Procedure  
Participants learned that they would take part in two unrelated studies and were introduced to a 
confederate posing as another participant. The two sat across from each other and performed the same 
dull task, rotating a clip around a stick repeatedly for 10 minutes. Then they learned that they needed to 
wait for the experimenter to prepare the next task. In the presence of the participant, the experimenter 
casually asked the confederate to talk to another potential participant over the phone, because this 
potential participant wanted to learn more about the task in order to decide whether to be involved in it.   
At this point, one third of the participants (small money condition) saw the experimenter offer 
the confederate ￥1 ($0.16) to describe the task as interesting and engaging, because the experimenter 
wanted the potential participant to have positive expectations about the task. Another third of participants ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
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(large money condition), saw the experimenter offer the confederate￥50 ($8.16) to do this. Participants 
in the lie for ￥1 condition and lie for ￥50 condition then watched the confederate get paid. The 
remaining participants (no lie condition) saw the experimenter instruct the confederate to describe the 
task truthfully. No money was offered. All participants watched the confederate make the phone call. 
Next the confederate turned to leave the room. Before exiting, the confederate extended his 
hand to half of the participants to initiate a handshake (hand-shaking condition). For the other half of 
participants (money-counting condition), the confederate departed and the experimenter asked 
participants to count ￥1000 five times under the pretense of a finger-dexterity task.  
Lastly, the experimenter told participants that their next task involved operating high-precision 
equipment for which they needed to wash their hands. Another experimenter, who was unaware of 
experimental conditions, inconspicuously used a stopwatch to record the duration (in seconds) that 
participants spent washing their hands. Participants were probed for suspicion (none was raised) and 
debriefed. 
Results and Discussion 
We anticipated an interaction between the object touched and lie conditions on hand washing 
time: Participants would behaviorally distance themselves by washing longer after touching a liar who 
lied for a smaller compared to a larger amount, but conversely would wash longer after having to touch 
money in the case when a lie took place for a larger as opposed to a smaller sum. We conducted a 3 (lie 
condition) × 2 (object touched condition) ANOVA
1 on seconds spent hand-washing. The main effect 
of object touched condition was not significant: participants in the hand-shaking condition (Msec= 7.60, 
SD = 0.30) did not differ on time spent on hand-washing from participants in the money-counting 
condition (Msec = 7.49, SD = 0.31), F(1, 154) = .058, p > .80. The lie-condition main effect was ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
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significant, F(2, 154) = 5.73, p < .01. Crucially, the interaction was significant, F(2, 154) = 4.76, p < .05 
(Figure 1). We proceeded with Tukey HSD comparisons. 
Participants spent longer hand-washing after they shook hands with a person who lied for a 
small sum (Msec = 9.13, SD = 3.37) than a large sum (Msec = 6.99, SD = 2.66), F(1, 154) = 8.50, p < .05. 
However, the effect of lie condition after counting money was not significant, F(1, 154) = 2.10, p > .10.  
_____________________________ 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
_____________________________ 
 
We next analyzed the interaction from the alternative standpoint. In the no lie condition, 
hand-shaking participants (Msec = 6.66, SD = 1.69) did not differ from money-counting participants (Msec 
= 6.45, SD = 2.17) on hand-washing, t(154) = .27, p > .75. In the small money condition, however, 
participants who shook hands with a liar spent longer on hand-washing (Msec = 9.13, SD = 3.37) than 
those who counted money (Msec = 7.47, SD = 2.46), t(154) = 2.27, p < .05. In contrast, in the large money 
condition, participants who counted money (Msec = 8.55, SD = 3.48) spent longer on hand-washing than 
those who shook hands with a liar (Msec = 6.99, SD = 2.66), t(154) = 2.09, p < .05.  
The results were consistent with hypotheses. Participants washed their hands longer, as a sign of 
desiring to be (psychically) clean, after watching a lie being told for a relatively small monetary sum and 
then coming into physical contact with the liar. After watching a lie being told for a large amount of 
money, participants washed longer following physical contact with money as opposed with the liar, 
suggesting that they felt dirtier after handling money.  
Experiment 2 ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
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The findings of Experiment 1, as supportive of the hypotheses as they may be, raise a few issues. 
Chief among them is the question about the amount of money needed to shift the causal weight from the 
perpetrator of an immoral act to money. To address this ‘inflection point’ issue, we conducted a pretest. 
Participants rated whether they thought someone would push another person over in order to pick up a 
certain amount of money. If half of participants responded with “yes” and half with “no” to a certain 
amount of money, then, by the logic of our theorizing, that suggests that half of them would blame money 
and half the perpetrator for the wrongdoing. That amount, then, would serve as the inflection point. We 
also aimed to find a value at which 80% of participants would respond “yes” (which we would designate 
as the large amount), and one at which 20% of participants would respond “yes” (which we would 
designate as the small amount). We then used these amounts in the main Experiment 2.   
The second question raised by Experiment 1 pertained to the “object touched” manipulation. 
Given that the money-counting task took longer than did the handshake, interpretation of the 
hand-washing outcome measure involves a potential confound. Therefore, Experiment 2 equalized the 
touching time across conditions. Thirdly, in Experiment 1, it is possible the longer hand-washing after 
seeing a moral transgression enacted for a certain amount of money was driven by distracting thoughts of 
that scene. To rule out this rival explanation, we controlled for cognitive elaboration by imposing a 
cognitive load task during hand-washing in Experiment 2. A fourth improvement on Experiment 1 was 
that we measured directly participants’ attributions of blame. This allows for more insight into the 
psychological processes. As before, we also tested participants' implicit attitudes towards money and the 
perpetrator.  
 Pretest ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
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We carried out a pretest to identify what constitutes a small, medium, and large amount of 
money. We tested 52 volunteers (43 females). Their ages ranged from 20 to 40 years (M = 24.17, SD = 
3.21). Participants saw a series of six digital color photographs that depicted a perpetrator knocking over 
someone in order to pick up some money off the ground. The protagonists’ faces were not visible to 
participants, as in a previous study using similar stimuli (Decety, Michalska, & Kinzler, 2011). Most 
important, the amount of money was blurred on the pictures (Figure 2).  
_____________________________ 
                      INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
_____________________________ 
  Next, participants responded with a “yes” or “no” to each of the following six monetary amounts: 
“Do you think the protagonist would push someone over like this to pick up  ￥10/￥50/￥100/￥500/
￥1000/￥2000?” Finally, participants recorded the least amount of money for which they thought the 
protagonist would push someone over. 
Results from linear interpolation showed that 50% of participants chose yes and 50% of them 
chose no somewhere around ￥300. Also, 15.38% of participants responded “yes” to  ￥50, whereas 
80.77% participants said yes to ￥2000. 
This inflection point (i.e.,  ￥300) is consistent with participants’ reports of the least amount of 
money for which they thought people would push someone over. The distribution of the amount of 
money is positively skewed, with the median being around ￥300. We selected  ￥300 as the inflection 
point, because it split participants into fairly evenly-sized groups that would push versus would not push ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
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over someone for that amount. We implemented ￥50 as the small amount of money and ￥2000 as the 
large amount of money.  
Method 
Participants and Experimental Design   
We tested 184 university volunteers individually (111 females). Their ages ranged from 18 to 50 
years (M = 22.63, SD = 4.68). One participant left the experiment before he finished the tasks, and 
therefore we discarded his data. The design was a 3 (money amount: small, medium, large)  ×2 (object 
touched: hand, money) between-subjects full factorial. We randomly assigned participants to one of the 
six experimental conditions. 
Procedure 
We presented participants with six digital color photographs of the same size. We displayed 
them in a successive manner to imply motion. The photographs portrayed a scene in which a protagonist 
pushed another person in order to snatch some money from the ground. Here, and contrary to the pretest, 
the amount of money was clearly visible to participants. Then we presented participants with enlarged 
images of fragments of those pictures. For half of participants, the close-up picture depicted the hand of 
the perpetrator reaching for the money, whereas, for the other half, it depicted the money on the ground. 
The experimenter asked participants to hold either the hand picture or money picture for 30 seconds. As 
a cover story, the experimenter instructed them to estimate the temperature of the picture they were 
holding.  
  Next, the experimenter told participants that the following task involved operating high-precision 
equipment for which they needed to clean their hands with a disposable wet wipe. They were asked to ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
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rehearse mentally a nine-digit number while washing their hands ostensibly as a test of multi-tasking. 
This procedure is used to control for participants’ cognitive elaboration during hand-washing. Another 
experimenter who was unaware of conditions inconspicuously used a stopwatch to record the length of 
time (in seconds) that participants spent wiping their hands.  
  Afterwards, participants completed a questionnaire that measured the proportion of blame 
attributed to the money versus perpetrator using a 100-point allocation. Participants recalled the pictures 
and allocated 100 points of blame between the money and the perpetrator. Then, participants rated their 
agreement with 10 statements measuring their explicit attitude toward money (1 = totally disagree, 10 = 
totally agree). Three were target statements: (a) “Money is the root of all evil”; (b) “Money is dung”; (c) 
“Capital comes dripping from head to toe, from every pore, with blood and dirt”. The remaining seven 
statements were fillers (e.g., “A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step”). Finally, we 
probed participants for suspicion (none was raised) and debriefed them.  
Results 
  We conducted a 3 (money amount) × 2 (object touched) ANOVA with hand-washing time as the 
dependent measure. As anticipated, the interaction was significant, F(2, 177) = 5.46, p < .01 (Figure 3). 
Simple effect analyses revealed that participants in the small money condition spent longer on 
hand-washing after holding the hand picture (Msec = 26.45, SD = 10.06) than after holding the money 
picture (Msec = 21.06, SD = 8.25), F(1, 177) = 5.01, p < .05. In the medium money condition, participants 
holding the hand picture (Msec = 21.80, SD = 6.99) did not differ on time spent hand-washing from those 
holding the money picture (Msec = 22.38, SD = 10.51), F(1, 177) = .059, p > .80. However, in the large 
money condition, participants spent longer on hand-washing after holding the money picture (Msec = ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
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28.11, SD = 9.79) than after holding the hand picture (Msec = 22.28, SD = 10.05), F(1, 177) = 5.86, p 
< .05.  
_____________________________ 
                INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
_____________________________ 
  An ANOVA on allocations of 100 points of blame yielded a main effect of amount of money, F(1, 
177) = 3.50, p < .05. Tukey HSD comparisons revealed that participants in the large money condition (M 
= 19.25, SD = 20.35) indicated that money was to be blamed to a greater extent than those in the small 
money condition (M = 11.70, SD = 14.37), F(1,177) = 6.03, p < .05. Participants in the small money 
condition (M = 88.29, SD = 2.19) blamed the perpetrator to a greater extent than those in the large money 
condition (M = 80.65, SD = 2.19), F(1,177) = 5.92, p < .05. Participants in the medium money condition 
(M = 12.11, SD = 12.81) blamed money less than those in the large money condition (M = 19.25, SD = 
20.35), F(1, 177) = 3.88, p < .05, but blamed money equivalently with those in the small money 
condition (M = 11.70, SD = 14.37) , p > .60. The perpetrator who committed the wrongdoing for a 
medium money was not assigned more blame than the perpetrator who committed the same wrongdoing 
for small or large money, Fmedium vs. small(1, 177) < 1, Fmedium vs. large(1, 177) = 1.83, p > .05.  
Of the three target statements intended to assess participants’ attitude toward money, we 
combined the two (“Money is the root of all evil”, “Money is dung”; r = 0.45, p < .0005) and excluded 
the third one (“Capital comes dripping from head to toe, from every pore, with blood and dirt”) due to its 
low correlation with the others. Participants’ attitude towards money did not differ in the small (M = 
11.85, SD = 5.33), medium (M = 11.97, SD = 1.00) or large money (M = 12.69, SD = 4.08) conditions, ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
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F(2, 176) = 0.557, p > .50. The effect of conditions on ratings of fillers items was not significant, F < 1. 
Participants’ explicit attitude toward money was independent of their hand-washing time, r(181) = -.08, 
p > .25. Neither participants’ attitude towards money (β = .09, t = 1.25, p > .20) nor blame explicitly 
attributed to money (β = -.08, t = -1.06, p > .25) predicted hand-washing time (Baron & Kenny, 1986).  
Experiment 2 addressed the limitations of Experiment 1 and replicated the finding that a 
relatively large amount of money exonerates perpetrators’ moral transgressions. The more blame that 
participants attributed to money, the more they agreed with the notions that money is filthy and evil. 
Participants were more likely to blame the money when a wrongdoing was committed for a larger rather 
than a smaller monetary sum. Conversely, when a wrongdoing was committed for a smaller monetary 
sum, the perpetrator took more blame than the money.  
Also, Experiment 2 identified the inflection point at which observers’ attitude shifts from 
money to the perpetrator. Of course, this inflection point is not an absolute value. Instead, it is a relative 
amount dependent on sample characteristics (e.g., what is a large amount to university students might not 
be to mid-career adults) and context surrounding the immoral behavior. In the current case, the blame on 
money and on the perpetrator evened out when the moral transgression was committed for ￥300 ($49). 
General Discussion 
Kant (1785/1996) argued that the goodness of an act is determined solely by its underlying good 
will or good intention, irrespective of its external outcome. The present research suggests that providing 
a monetary incentive for an immoral behavior has a systematic effect on attributions. A moral 
transgression for a large sum of money is considered less despicable than a moral transgression for a 
small sum of money. People long have believed money to be a treacherously powerful force in their and ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
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others’ lives (Lea & Webley, 2006), a belief that apparently renders money a readily-available 
justification for wrongdoings.  
In these two experiments, participants served as observers of wrongdoings and then had 
physical contact with the perpetrator. Results indicated that merely observing rather than participating in 
immoral behaviors elicits a sense of potential contamination after touching the moral transgressor. The 
key outcome we measured was duration of hand-washing, which we took to indicate a desire to cleanse 
symbolically oneself after such contamination. Our results suggest that people view (and become 
contaminated by) immoral actions committed for a small price as more immoral than those done for a 
large price. When an immoral act is enacted for a large sum of money, money – again symbolically – 
seems to share some responsibility for the blame and therefore observers view the wrongdoer as less 
filthy. However, when an immoral behavior is rewarded insufficiently, this constitutes a lack of an 
external justification for the bad behavior, and so observers attribute the wrongdoing back to where it 
perhaps should belong: to the wrongdoer.  
When a person’s behavior harms the welfare and legitimate interests of others, attributing the 
behavior to money can diminish the moral responsibility of the person. Money constitutes a compelling 
external justification, because people may believe it to be a potent and perilous force in their lives. 
Justifying one’s wrongdoing in consideration of the monetary payoffs diminishes moral dissonance and 
the need for attitude change. Similarly, justifying others’ wrongdoing with money improves others’ 
moral image to oneself (and others). 
When a behavior is perceived to be due to external rewards like money, the attribution of the 
behavior to intrinsic reasons is weakened. Bem (1972, p. 39) expressed one of the basic tenets of ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
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attribution theory: “A person will infer that he was intrinsically motivated to execute the induced 
behavior to the extent that external contingencies of reinforcement appeared to be absent.” Previous 
studies have established the so-called overjustification effect (Condry, 1977), namely that behavior 
performed for money weakens the attribution of the behavior to intrinsic reasons, even when the behavior 
is consistent with the actor’s initial intrinsic interest in performing the behavior. For example, 
participants who are offered payment to help others rate themselves as less altruistic than those who are 
not offered such payment (Batson, Coke, Jasnoski, & Hanson, 1978). Likewise, the present findings 
suggest that justifying behaviors with money deprives people not only of their internal motivation and 
altruistic tendency, but also of taking moral responsibility. When a moral transgression has been 
performed for money, the person who performs the transgression is considered as less lamentable, 
because observers do not make internal attributions for the behavior. 
 Money is both loved and despised. On the one hand, people want money: money is an object of 
desire. On the other hand, they sometimes consider money filthy and evil. Our findings offer a novel 
perspective on the paradoxical attitude that people hold towards immorality and money. Blame attributed 
to the perpetrator, symbolically reflected by observers’ hand-washing behavior, depends on the 
monetary payoffs.  Money itself is neither good nor evil but when seen as a cause of immoral behavior, 
it alters the moral responsibility of the perpetrator. When an immoral act is not paid enough, money 
cannot be used as an excuse and the perpetrator is deservedly blamed.  
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Footnote 
1As the hand-washing data were positively skewed, we carried out a log transformation to 
ensure that the data were normally distributed. Analyses on the log-transformed data produced results 
similar to the reported ones.  
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FIGURES 
Figure 1. Length of time spent washing hands after shaking hands with the 
confederate or counting money in Experiment 1. 
Figure 2. Dynamic visual stimuli used in the pretest. 
Figure 3. Length of time spent washing hands after contacting the hand or the money 
in Experiment 2. 
 
   ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
  Figure 1. Length of time spent washing hands after shaking hands with the 
confederate or counting money in Experiment 1. 
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Figure 2. Dynamic visual stimuli used in the pretest. 
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Figure 3. Length of time spent washing hands after contacting the hand or the 
money in Experiment 2. 
 
*p < .05. 